NASA may not have been able to put a man on the moon if it was not for the Apollo 1 fire. The Apollo 1 fire occurred on January 27, 1967, inside the spacecraft’s command module, and caused the deaths of the three astronauts that occupied the spacecraft: Virgil “Gus” Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee. The fire happened during a plugs-out test which checks how the spacecraft performs without offboard power. Investigators assume it started from an electrical short. The unsafe conditions of the spacecraft made the fire spread quickly which caused the astronauts to die within minutes. After the fire, several groups were impacted, such as NASA’s space program, the government, and the victims’ loved ones. NASA’s safety regulations for spacecrafts improved and the government was involved with the investigation process.
The reason this fire was so impactful to NASA was because of the history of the space program. The space race, a race between the Soviet Union and the United States to become the first nation to put a person in space, started on August 2, 1955. NASA was created on October 1, 1958, as a response to the Soviet Union’s early space achievements. The Mercury Program was NASA’s first program. Its goal was to place a manned spacecraft into an orbital flight around Earth. After that mission had been completed in 1963, the Gemini Program began in 1965 and lasted a year. The mission of this program was to test the skills and technologies needed to land on the moon. The Apollo Program had started developing more after the Gemini Program had ended and its mission was to put a man on the moon and return them safely to Earth. Although this program started in 1961, the Apollo 1 was constructed between 1964 and 1966. The Apollo 1 was the first crewed mission of the Apollo program and was planned to be a low-Earth orbital test of the command and service module. It was scheduled to launch February 21, 1967. However, that was not possible as the capsule caught on fire during its final test before the scheduled launch. Adam Mann, a journalist that specializes in physics and astronomy stories, said, “The failure was a turning point for the program, resulting in extensive redesigns to the command module. It was more than 18 months before NASA tried to send more humans into space again.”[1]
Another reason this fire was impactful was because of who the astronauts that died were. Gus Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee had accomplished many achievements before their deaths. These astronauts were well known by the public, especially Gus Grissom. Before joining the astronaut corps, Grissom and White were in the Air Force and became test pilots while Chaffee was part of the Navy as a naval aviator. During Grissom’s time in the Air Force, he fought in the Korean War and was a test pilot during the Cold War until he was invited to Project Mercury. Once he became an astronaut, he flew the Liberty Bell 7, which was a successful suborbital flight. Afterward, he was picked to fly the Molly Brown spacecraft during the Gemini Program and orbited 3 times with his copilot. He was known to be the first human to fly in space twice. However, Chaffee and White were also known by their accomplishments as well. Chaffee was one of the youngest pilots in his unit and Edward White flew Gemini 4 on June 3, 1965, and became known as the first to propel himself in space with a maneuvering unit[2]. These astronauts were about to accomplish even more with Apollo 1 until the unsafe conditions of the spacecraft, that led to the fire, caused their deaths.
One of the unsafe conditions of the Apollo 1 spacecraft was its hatch design. “The hatch on the Apollo 1 command module opened inward and consisted of three parts: a removable inner hatch, a hinged outer hatch and an outer hatch cover. Each hatch opened independently and with different tools.”[3] Additionally, NASA performed tests to see if the hatch could open within ninety seconds, and none of the tests were successful. Since, the plugs-out test was on the ground, the pressure was greater than what it would be in space, so it was even more difficult to open the hatch while on the ground as the hatch had a tighter seal due to the pressure. This hatch design made the spacecraft like a trap for the astronauts that were stuck inside of it during the fire as under the amount of pressure, it was impossible for the astronauts to open the hatch. It took NASA’s ground crew five minutes to open the hatch after the fire had ended.
Another unsafe condition of the Apollo 1 spacecraft was the 100 percent oxygenated atmosphere. NASA chose to create this atmosphere as it was less complex and not as heavy as a two-gas system, which would be a mixture of nitrogen and oxygen. Many NASA employees, including the project manager for Apollo 1, stated their concern with this oxygenated atmosphere as it was very fire prone. But NASA still wanted to go forward with the 100 percent oxygen atmosphere as it was also much simpler to achieve. If a two-gas system was implemented, NASA would have to invent a way to measure the mixture of the gases constantly, and if the system failed, then the astronauts could lose consciousness while in space[4]. But this oxygenated atmosphere caused an increase in the flammability of the spacecraft drastically. A case study done by John Carroll University on the flammability of fabrics that were inside of Apollo 1 shows how the oxygenated atmosphere increased the materials’ flammability. Students at the university set Velcro that was wrapped around polyethylene wiring on fire to determine how fast the fire would have spread in the spacecraft without a 100 percent oxygenated atmosphere (since those materials were in the spacecraft). The students discovered it would take about 40-90 minutes for the fire to travel the distance of the command module’s diameter and 15 to 25 minutes to travel the distance of the command module’s height [5] .Due to that discovery, the students were able to conclude that the 100 percent oxygenated atmosphere is what caused the fire to spread at least twice as fast, compared to a fire spreading in a mixed-gas atmosphere.
Other problems that caused the fire to be deadly were combustible materials and communication difficulties NASA was having with the spacecraft. The spacecraft had easily damageable wires, an excessive amount of Velcro in its interior, nylon netting, and foam pads[6]. When the fire started, it spread rapidly due to all the combustible materials. The 100 percent oxygenated atmosphere made those materials even more flammable during the fire. The other issue was the communication problems NASA was having during the plugs-out test. NASA crew members knew before the plugs-out test that the spacecraft was experiencing communication issues. The test conductor, Skip Chauvin, stated how sometimes he could not understand what the astronauts were saying. Also, during the countdown to the test, static, garbled words, and long pauses occurred during communication between the spacecraft and launch control [7]. As a result, during the fire, NASA officials could not immediately recognize that there was a fire. It took the staff a couple of seconds to make out what the astronauts were saying, then all they could hear the astronauts say was “Fire!”. By the time NASA officials had determined there was a fire, the astronauts had already perished.
Only days after the fire, NASA constructed an investigation board, the Apollo 204 Review Board, to determine the unsafe conditions that caused the fire and recommend changes to future spacecrafts. Their recommended changes were implemented in the Block II design. The investigation process and the redesigning of spacecrafts delayed putting a man on the Moon. NASA aimed to have put a man on the Moon by the end of the 1960s. This goal was still achieved but it was delayed heavily due to the fire. Since the investigation board was made up of all NASA officials, the public was concerned that the board was going to cover up evidence that would show it was NASA’s fault. However, Congress conducted hearings to review the Apollo 204 Investigation Board Report and collect statements from key eyewitnesses. Through these hearings, the Senate published a report containing all collected evidence and statements possible on the tragedy, along with a summary of the review board’s report, which included the board’s findings and recommended changes.
One of the significant changes to the spacecraft design after the fire was inventing a simplifier and easy-to-open hatch. The new hatch consists of a simple, unified mechanism that can open from the inside or outside of the spacecraft within three seconds [8]. This new hatch is implemented in the Block II design which is now used for all manned flights. The astronauts can unlatch the entire assembly, while on the launch pad, through activating a pump handle and pushing open the carefully counterbalanced combined unit. Additionally, the launch crew could insert a tool to open the hatch from the outside[9]. The new hatch design was a much-needed change as the astronauts died because they could not escape. Grissom tried to repeatedly open the hatch, but it was impossible due to the intense pressure, along with how complicated it was to open.
Another change that occurred was the usage of a two-gas system in spacecrafts. Apollo 1 was the last time a pure oxygen environment was used in a capsule on the ground. NASA decided to use a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen gases in the capsule while on ground but would switch to a 100 percent oxygen atmosphere once the spacecraft took off [10]. As, if a fire started while the spacecraft was in space, it would still spread much slower than if it was on the ground. The two-gas atmosphere consists of 60 percent oxygen and 40 percent nitrogen[11]. After NASA decided to switch to using this two-gas atmosphere, they also decided that the astronauts would continue to breathe pure oxygen through their spacesuits before and during launch to reduce the risk of decompression sickness. They chose to continue this method as while the command module is in orbit, it would gradually replace the mixed-gas atmosphere with pure oxygen. Although switching to a two-gas atmosphere was more complicated and more difficult to achieve safely, it was necessary to make on-ground tests safer.
Another change that was made after the fire was the elimination of as many combustible materials as possible from in the capsule’s interior. NASA removed a significant amount of Velcro (as there should have been at least one half less used inside the spacecraft). Velcro was limited to no more than two-inch by two-inch squares that had to be spaced out from one another[12]. NASA started to use beta cloth, which is fire-resistant (unlike Velcro), on the interior of the spacecraft for better insulation and around the outside of the spacesuits to make them more fire-resistant as well[13].
The Block II design included all these changes and more. All the wiring in the interior now has better insulation and shielding by metal troughs. The new design also includes an emergency venting system that allowed the cabin pressure to be released quickly. An escape system was also included that allowed astronauts to get off the mobile launcher tower (which is where the astronauts enter the spacecraft) in case of an explosion. Additionally, NASA increased the number of fire and medical personnel on scene in case of emergencies. NASA spent over half a billion dollars on this redesign and added safety measures[14]. The design used in the remaining Apollo missions, which includes Apollo 11, sent men to the Moon. These changes only happened because of this fire.
Not only did the fire impact NASA and the government, it, of course, also impacted the victims’ families. The wives of the astronauts- Betty Grissom, Pat White, and Martha Chaffee- reacted differently when hearing the news that they had lost their husband. The wives found out by NASA officials coming to their house to tell them the news. Betty Grissom did not cry when she found out, but instead stated how she was prepared for this kind of news. Betty stated, “I faced Gus’ death 100,000 times,” while he had been in the space program and that she had understood it was bound to happen sooner or later[15]. Pat White reacted to the news much differently. She responded to the news with, “Who am I? I’ve lost everything. It’s all gone.”[16] On the other hand, Martha Chaffee responded with disbelief when she heard the news. It took her time to come to understand her husband was really gone. Additionally, Betty Grissom blamed NASA for killing her husband and filed a $10 million lawsuit against it. The lawsuit was settled in 1972 for $350,000, which is $2,643,120 today, and this was paid to all the victims’ families[17].
Overall, the Apollo 1 design was unsafe and fire prone. Its design caused the fire to grow so rapidly, which led to the loss of three astronauts. The loss of these men impacted future spacecraft designs, showed the government and NASA’s response to such a tragedy, and how the deaths caused immense grief to the victims’ families and to NASA. This fire allowed NASA to see all the unsafe conditions of the spacecraft and fix them before sending men to the moon. The added safety measures made putting a man on the moon safer. If it wasn’t for this fire, the men that were going to the moon would have been in a fire prone spacecraft.
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I hereby declare upon my word of honor that I have neither given nor received unauthorized help on this work.
Izabelle Stuchell
[1] “The Apollo Program: How NASA Sent Astronauts to The Moon”, Space Magazine, June 25, 2020, https://www.space.com/apollo-program-overview.html
[2] Ryan Walters, Apollo 1: The Tragedy That Put Us on The Moon (Regnery History, 2021), 104-106.
[3] “Trial By Fire: The Legacy of Apollo 1,” American Institute of Physics, accessed October 21, 2024, https://www.aip.org/news/trial-fire-legacy-apollo-1.
[4] Walters, Apollo 1 Tragedy, 196-197.
[5] Gregory Dilisi, “The Apollo 1 Fire: A Case Study in the Flammability of Fabrics, With Supplemental Material for On-Line Appendix,” Carroll Collected, no. 4 (2019), https://collected.jcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=fac_bib_2019.
[6] “Trial By Fire: The Legacy of Apollo 1,”
[7] Walters, Apollo 1 Tragedy,159-161.
[8] “55 Years Ago: The Apollo 1 Fire and Its Aftermath,” NASA, February 3, 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/history/55-years-ago-the-apollo-1-fire-and-its-aftermath/.
[9] “Learning from Tragedy: Apollo 1 Fire,” National Air and Space Museum, January 27,2017, https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/learning-tragedy-apollo-1-fire.
[10] Walters, Apollo 1 Tragedy,221.
[11] “50th anniversary of NASA deciding on a mixed gas atmosphere for Apollo, a direct result of the Apollo fire,” NASA, October 23, 2023, https://www.nasa.gov/history/50th-anniversary-of-nasa-deciding-on-a-mixed-gas-atmosphere-for-apollo-a-direct-result-of-the-apollo-fire/.
[12] Walters, Apollo 1 Tragedy, 221.
[13] Evelyne Orndoff, “Flame Retardant Fibers for Human Space Exploration-Past, Present, Future,” NASA Center for Aerospace Information Conference Proceedings (2017): 1-3. https://www.proquest.com/docview/2128070815/F3FF29214AF04846PQ/1?%20Proceedings&accountid=12299&sourcetype=Conference%20Papers%20.
[14] Walters, Apollo 1 Tragedy, 221.
[15] Walters, Apollo 1 Tragedy174.
[16] Walters, Apollo 1 Tragedy, 221.
[17] Walters, Apollo 1 Tragedy, 224.